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ABSTRACT
Current power distribution network design makes it attractive
for agents to generate their own power (distributed generation)
and to construct private infrastructure (e.g., distribution lines)
to exchange power without using the main public grid. We show
that such private transactions may increase overall network load
because of increased transmission distances, thus increasing resis-
tive losses. We present a coordination scheme for the centralized
control of private infrastructure that satisﬁes participation con-
straints and budget balance. Experiments show that our scheme
reduces distribution losses by 4-5% when there are only a con-
stant number of private lines and by 55%-60% when the number
of private lines is proportional to the number of agents.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial In-
telligence
General Terms
Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, Economics
Keywords
Energy and Emissions, Incentives for Cooperation, Game
Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is roughly deﬁned as an augmented electri-
cal grid that gathers information about its own operation to
automatically improve eﬃciency and reliability. Utility com-
panies have been the primary driver of development of the
smart grid thus far, seeing an opportunity to replace moni-
toring tasks undertaken by people with centralized electronic
sensing and control. Full realization of the smart grid will
require intelligent control and incentive schemes to make the
best use of information so gathered [15].
In recent years, it has become increasingly easy for“house-
hold” consumers to generate electricity at cheaper cost and
with lower emissions using renewable sources —most no-
tably wind and solar power. Installation capacity is often
higher in rural areas where space is available. Groups of
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such consumers can often limit their dependence on the pub-
lic grid by exploiting local generation, e.g., in the form of
microgrids [10]. Microgrids are groups of generators and
consumers connected to the larger grid at a single point,
which allows decoupling in the event of grid failures. For in-
stance, consider a rural area in a developing country where
a signiﬁcant amount of power is produced by wind farms,
solar panels or biofuels. These tend to be located nearer to
farms than to urban centers, so local generators may strike
deals with nearby consumers (e.g., farms) to construct pri-
vate lines and exchange power outside the public grid. In-
deed, due to ﬁxed rate schedules that mediate transactions
with the public grid, it is often more proﬁtable for them to
sell directly to their neighbors than to the grid.
Unfortunately, as we will see below, such transactions can
reduce overall eﬃciency. The dynamic above creates tension
between the publicly-managed grid and the private agents
it serves. Though the public grid may wish to construct
additional distribution capacity, especially in the presence
of increasingly distributed, unreliable generation, we show
that the beneﬁt of doing so is limited by the degree of pri-
vate control of distribution lines allowed. The network in
Fig. 1 (explained further in Sec. 3) illustrates this. Integrat-
ing microgids and designing control and incentive schemes
that mitigate this potential ineﬃciency are important chal-
lenges in smart grid design.
In this work, we develop a routing scheme that allows
agents in a local microgrid to coordinate private distribu-
tion with the publicly-owned utility. Our scheme achieves
optimal distribution at minimum cost while satisfying par-
ticipation constraints—each agent is at least as well oﬀ as in
the uncoordinated regime. Our scheme can also be used as
a basis for determining cost-sharing of new local generation
and distribution infrastructure among agents by quantifying
their individual beneﬁts assuming optimal usage.
This rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we
brieﬂy describe our setting, outline our model of the prob-
lem, and discuss related work. In Sec. 3, we describe several
models of agent behavior and the corresponding incentives.
In Sec. 4, we present an incentive/routing scheme that coor-
dinates agents on the private network with the public net-
work. Experiments in Sec. 5 compare the performance of our
system under various models of agent behavior. We present
conclusions and future directions in Sec. 6.
2. SETTING AND NETWORK MODEL
Setting: Current electricity pricing regimes in many ju-
risdictions require that electric utilities report the expected
demand of their consumers, and generators report their ex-T
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Figure 1: A network with private and public links. Circles rep-
resent net generators and squares net consumers. Node T rep-
resents the connection to the outside power grid. Solid lines are
publicly-owned links and dashed lines private links. We assume
that public and private links have roughly the same voltage and
resistance. Qi denotes the supply of agent Ai.
pected production, to an independent system operator (ISO)
[7]. ISO-controlled markets are an example of a mechanism
where a central protocol maps declarations by market par-
ticipants to transactions and payments. The ISO typically
solves a linear relaxation of the distribution problem, telling
generators how much power to produce in a way that ne-
glects the non-linear physics of the system. This relaxation
is more accurate in relatively uncongested networks or those
with short distribution lines, and can be solved eﬃciently
and transparently. But a tension exists between easy-to-
calculate, transparent prices and prices that incentivize op-
timal behavior. The ISO solution is relatively complex, but
its implementation can be analyzed and simulated by mar-
ket participants to determine how to most advantageously
represent their supply, demand or production costs.
The generation and distribution context we analyze is
speculative in certain aspects, as it describes a system that
is still under debate by policymakers. At a high level, we
assume that small producers and consumers will have signif-
icant control over trading decisions in future systems, since
increasing the eﬃciency of electricity markets will likely be
accomplished through the deregulation made possible by
smart grid technology and ﬁne-grained control of routing
decisions. We also note that nearly all research in power dis-
tribution uses some approximate model of electrical physics
since exact power ﬂow is highly non-convex. We simplify
the physics to focus on the dynamics of electricity exchange
between pairs of agents. Our most signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation
is neglecting sympathetic ﬂows (see below), but we believe
they can be incorporated into our model as well.
Network Model: We ﬁrst introduce the notation needed
to describe our model. The network G =( V,E)i sc o m -
posed of two parts, a public network Gpub =( V,Epub)t h a t
is connected and a private network Gpriv =( Vpriv,E priv)
where Vpriv ⊆ V . A single node T represents the link to
the outside grid, which will buy or sell arbitrary amounts of
electricity; it is not connected to any agent via the private
network. Let fu,v denote the power sent from agent u to
agent v over edge (u,v), and let f
 
u,v denote the power re-
ceived by agent v over edge (u,v) after losses are deducted.
These variables will be constrained to be non-negative. The
fu,v variables are used to formulate the problem as an op-
timization, but the solutions will always have at least one
of fu,v and fv,u equal to zero, since power may only ﬂow in
one direction at a given time.
Each agent Av (except T)h a sautility function Uv(xv)f o r
any allocation xv of power representing their net consump-
tion. Because demand for electricity is usually highly inelas-
tic, we represent a utility function by a single constant Qv,
the agent’s, steady-state (long-term) supply or demand for
power. We will assume that the variable cost of distributed
generation sources is near zero (realistically, since they are
renewables).
1 Positive Qv reﬂects a surplus of electricity, in
w h i c hc a s ew ea s s u m eUv(xv) is very steep for xv < 0a n d
equal to zero thereafter. Negative Qv reﬂects net demand,
where Uv(xv) is very steep for xv < −Qv and zero after. We
will only consider settings in which all demands can be fea-
sibly satisﬁed, so we treat these utility functions as if they
were constraints on the ﬁnal solution. These assumptions
about utility functions simplify the analysis signiﬁcantly.
Fig. 1 illustrates the model: each circle is a net gener-
ator and each square a net consumer, with Qv being net
power generated by agent Av. T represents the connection
to the public grid, while public and private lines are solid
and dashed lines, respectively.
We consider several models of agent behavior below corre-
sponding to diﬀerent degrees of coordination and incentive
structures. Each model, together with an agent’s connec-
tions, will determine that agent’s strategy space. All models
below share a common simpliﬁed physics model:
• Flow of electricity must be conserved: ﬂow into any v
must equal ﬂow out of v less the agent’s supply Qv.
• Resistive losses occur when power is transmitted be-
tween two nodes. Energy lost to heat and radiation is
proportional to the square of the amount transmitted,
and depends on the voltage and resistance of a par-
ticular link. Let Ru,v be the resistance and Uu,v the
voltage on edge (u,v). If u sends fu,v units of power
over the line (u,v), the amount v receives from u is:
f 
u,v = fu,v −
f2
u,vRu,v
U2
u,v
(1)
Note that Ru,v is proportional to the length of (u,v).
Resistive losses are assumed to be negligible in many
simpliﬁed power ﬂow models, but their inclusion—even
though they are relatively small (about 7% avg.)—
changes the dynamics of the distribution game.
• Transformer losses occur when electricity is “stepped
up/down” between high public grid voltages and low
local grid voltages at T.T h i sl o s si sac o n s t a n tf r a c t i o n
β of the power converted.
• Electricity can be disposed of at any network node.
2
From a physics standpoint, our simpliﬁed model treats al-
ternating current (AC), the choice of most power systems
worldwide, as direct current (DC), which is less complicated
to deal with, and is a common simpliﬁcation in power sys-
tems research (ﬂow prediction in AC networks is often non-
convex) [11]. We also neglect Kirchhoﬀ’s voltage law, that
causes power to ﬂow sympathetically on loops. Below we
introduce an energy-minimization problem that will approx-
imate physics-induced ﬂow on our simpliﬁed model.
1There are obvious limits to the assumption of total de-
mand inelasticity in electricity consumption, with studies
restricted to small price ranges. The problem of making
electricity demand more sensitive to cost, whether through
price or other means (e.g., visual feedback) is an important
one that is beyond the scope of our work.
2This assumption simpliﬁes computation. In real systems,
free disposal may be used to compute payments and more
accurate computation to predict ﬂows.To justify our physical model, we observe that it gives an
upper bound on the eﬃciency of true physics-based routing;
in particular, AC power introduces interference when cur-
rents are out of phase, and Kirchhoﬀ’s law introduces“phan-
tom” power ﬂows that are not useful for achieving the rout-
ing objective. We also note that any physics model can be
substituted into the analysis without aﬀecting calculations
in other areas. We use an “optimistic” high-level physics
model to show that the “goals of physics” are not the same
as those of a grid operator; in particular, physics-based rout-
ing does not take into account the cost of generation from
a particular source. High-cost power can be overused if it is
close to its consumers, even though using far-away low-cost
power, despite incurring higher losses, may be more cost
eﬀective and have lower emissions.
To see how private routing can aﬀect the network, consider
Fig. 1. Since the grid’s buy and sell prices are diﬀerent, A5
and A6 will exchange power over the privately owned dashed
edge, at a mutually beneﬁcial price between the grid buy/sell
prices. The public grid must then send power over a long
distance from T to A7. If private edge (5,6) did not exist,
power would only need to be sent from T to A5,w h i c hi s
closer. Due to resistive losses, the existence of the private
edge between A5 and A6 combined with rational behavior
of A5 and A6 decreases the social welfare of the resulting
routing equilibrium.
Below we outline diﬀerent ways in which coalitions of
agents can coordinate their behavior to maximize their col-
lective utility, assuming they can divide any surplus gener-
ated appropriately. The public network is centrally man-
aged, but routing on any private link can be arbitrarily con-
trolled. We assume agents in separate coalitions do not trade
with each other on the private network (otherwise, they will
be taken as part of the same coalition).
Two coordination issues arise in this setting. The ﬁrst is
ﬁnding optimal coordinated strategies, or a routing scheme,
for the grand coalition of all agents: complete coordination
will ensure all agent demands are met at minimum cost. The
second is ﬁnding an incentive scheme, or payments, that sta-
bilize the grand coalition by aligning their interests to induce
minimum cost ﬂow on the network. We ﬁrst address the for-
mer, assuming that agents can ﬁnd stabilizing payments.
Related Work: Our model can be viewed as a cooperative
game [14], though because of potential externalities imposed
by one coalition on another—if two coalitions use the same
line, losses are greater than if only one did—standard charac-
teristic function representations do not apply directly. If not
f o rt h i s ,o u rm o d e lc o u l db ev i e w e da samarket game [20],
where supply/demand correspond to initial endowments and
trading is restricted to occur between agents in the same
coalition. The core of a market game is non-empty if agent
utilities are concave and no losses occur in trading. Exten-
sions that accommodate loss due to trading (e.g., transac-
tion costs) [17] are needed in our model since diﬀerent links
have diﬀerent losses that vary with load. Models of prices
sensitive to physical constraints have been proposed [5], but
place a large “choice” burden on market participants and
ignore transactions outside the market.
Previous work in communication networks has produced
edge-based market-clearing prices that induce Nash equilib-
ria in routing games, for control in networks without delays
[9, 8] and monopolist/oligopolist-control in restricted classes
of networks with convex delays [1, 2]. The quality of such
networks has also been studied [4, 6]. These latter mod-
els reﬂect the same type of congestion-induced externalities
that arise in our model, but do not oﬀer the generality of
analysis we need. Our model of the physics of distribution
was inspired primarily by [18, 24].
Smart grid research has largely focused on hardware de-
velopment, but has been an area of increasing concentration
in AI [15], primarily addressing coordination among market-
facing agents. One goal of this research is to shape demand
to reduce maximum loads and react to ﬂuctuations in supply
availability (e.g., by shifting some peak demand to oﬀ-peak
hours). Peak demand is a critical driver of supply costs (typ-
ically provided by ﬁnely adjustable, but expensive oil or gas
turbines). Large-scale distributed battery capacity can ad-
dress this problem (e.g., using the batteries of idle electric
cars) but speciﬁc coordination algorithms have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on eﬃciency [23]. Another approach is to coordinate
battery charging and use [3]. Our approach diﬀers from the
perspective laid out by Ramchurn et al. [15] as physical net-
work constraints make distributed computation diﬃcult. We
diﬀer from Alam et al. [3] by focusing on eﬃciency in sys-
tems where the infrastructure is owned by diﬀerent agents
and losses occur in distribution.
Recent work has looked at coalitions of consumers with
complementary demands, which are cheaper to supply be-
cause of their ﬂatter load proﬁles. Incentives for coalition
formation have been investigated [21]. To relieve consumers
from constant usage decisions based on supply availability,
intelligent agents can manage usage and storage based on
user preferences [22]. Similar coordination issues exist on the
supply-side of the market; for instance, the unpredictability
of wind power means that coalitions of generators can more
easily negotiate contracts with ISOs [16].
3. MODELS OF AGENT BEHAVIOR
We compare optimal agent routing behavior under four
diﬀerent models of cooperation. In addition to a mathemat-
ical speciﬁcation for each model, we provide a description of
the ﬂows it induces on the network in Fig. 1. Induced ﬂows
in each model are computed sequentially in two stages. In
the private stage, agents on the private network agree to
exchange power. In the public stage, routing on the public
network occurs given net demands after the private stage,
and any payments are made between the grid and the agents.
The Ad Hoc Model. The ad hoc model simulates sys-
tem behavior when agents make decisions in a local, myopic
manner without coordination or cooperation. Agents will
only ever trade power with their neighbors, and they do so
in order of closeness. Each trade is made to maximize the
joint utility of the two traders. This model probably best
reﬂects status quo behavior because private lines are unreg-
ulated, and there are few of them. It is unlikely that agents
that are very distant from each other will be able to discover
that it would be beneﬁcial to build a private line between
them. Although the random network generation model we
use in experiments below does not take distance into ac-
count, this behavior model favors the use of lines between
agents that are closer to each other. The routing on the
public network is induced by physics, which aligns with the
primarily physics-based routing that occurs on the public
grid. To compute exchanges on the private network, we or-
der private edges by increasing length—agents that are close
together are more likely to transact because they are gener-
ally more familiar with each other. For each (u,v) ∈ Epriv,the non-negative ﬂow on that edge is set such that the total
utility of agents u and v is maximized:
max
fu,v
 
ps(Qu − fu,v)i f Qu − fu,v ≥ 0
−pb(Qu − fu,v)i f Qu − fu,v < 0
+
 
ps(Qv + f 
u,v)i f Qv + f 
u,v ≥ 0
−pb(Qv + f 
u,v)i f Qv + f 
u,v < 0
(2)
where pb and ps represent the grid buy and sell prices. We
then update the demands of these two nodes by setting
Q
new
u = Q
old
u − fu,v and Q
new
v = Q
old
v + f
 
u,v.W ec o n t i n u e
through the ordered sequence of edges until no proﬁtable
trades remain. Note that two agents only exchange if one is
a net generator and the other a net consumer, and agents
only trade with their immediate neighbors in Gpriv.
After these local transactions have occurred, remaining
demand is met using physics-based ﬂow. This occurs with-
out the agents choosing a strategy because they are unable
to aﬀect the ﬂow on infrastructure that they do not own.
Physics-based routing uses the physics model described in
the previous section. We minimize distribution losses by
solving the following optimization:
min
fu,v,∀(u,v)∈Epub
 
(u,v)∈Epub
f2
u,vRu,v
U2
u,v
+
β
1 − β
 
v:(T,v)∈Epub
fT,v + β
 
v:(v,T)∈Epub
f 
v,T (3)
subject to, for each node v ∈ V :
Q 
v +
 
u:(u,v)∈E
f 
u,v ≥
 
u:(v,u)∈E
fv,u (4)
where Q
 
v (in this case, Q
new
v ) is the supply of node v in-
duced by the ﬂows from private trading. The ﬁrst term of
Objective 3 represents the resistive losses incurred on ev-
ery edge in the public network, while the second and third
terms represent losses due to voltage step down/up at node
T. Constraint 4 requires that ﬂow be conserved at every
node in the network.
We observe the following induced ﬂows on the network
in Fig. 1 under this ad hoc model. On the upper branch,
A1 sends power to A2, but the private edge (2,3) remains
unused because A1 is unable to trade with A3 in the pri-
vate stage. This causes public edge (2,3) to carry more
power than necessary, incurring higher losses. On the mid-
dle branch, the cost of supplying A4 is higher than neces-
sary because physics-induced routing equalizes the losses on
(T,4) and (1,4)—wasting power from A1— a sl o n ga sl o s s e s
on (1,4) exceed β. On the lower branch, A6 sends its power
to A5,l e a v i n gA7 to receive power from T.T h i si si n e ﬃ c i e n t
because A5 is closer to T than is A7.
The Private Self-Interest Model. The private self-
interest model reﬂects agents on the private network co-
operating to maximize their aggregate utility under ﬁxed
public network pricing. The ﬂow on the public network
is determined by physics, analogous to that in the ad hoc
model (minimizing distribution losses under basic physical
constraints). Agents on the private network solve the fol-
lowing optimization:
min
fu,v:(u,v)∈Epriv
 
v∈Vpriv
 
−ps(Qv + x 
v)i f Qv + x 
v ≥ 0
pb(Qv + x 
v)i f Qv + x 
v < 0
(5)
where
x 
v =
 
u:(u,v)∈Epriv
f 
u,v −
 
u:(v,u)∈Epriv
fv,u (6)
Objective 5 represents the total cost to nodes on the private
network to satisfy remaining demand from (or sell surplus
to) the public grid after all (optimal) private transactions are
made. After the private agents have minimized their liability
to the grid, physics governs ﬂow on the public network as in
the ad hoc model (Objective 3 subject to Constraint 4).
In this model, the ﬂow on the middle and lower branches
of Fig. 1 is the same as in the ad hoc model. On the up-
per branch, A1 sends power to A3 during the private stage
(exchanges between non-adjacent nodes is now permitted).
However, this does not reduce the cost of power drawn from
the public network; it merely shifts load from public to pri-
vate edges, leaving public edges virtually unused if there is
little production on the private network.
By solving the optimization, agents on the private network
maximize their aggregate utility. However, they still must
divide up the surplus in a way so that none of their agents
defect. We discuss this problem in Sec. 4.
The Cooperative Model. In the cooperative model,
agents on the private network distribute electricity so that
the load on the public network is minimized (again, ﬂow on
the public network is determined by physics). The agents
solve a joint optimization that minimizes the overall cost
to supply electricity to the entire network by minimizing
the amount of externally generated power consumed by the
entire set of agents (according to our assumption that all
locally generated power is from renewable sources and thus
has near zero marginal cost). It requires suitable incentives
to induce cooperation, as we discuss in Sec. 4. Minimizing
the overall draw from the grid requires arranging ﬂows on
the private network that solve the following optimization:
min
fu,v:(u,v)∈Epriv
1
1 − β
 
v:(T,v)∈E
fT,v − (1 − β)
 
v:(v,T)∈E
f 
v,T (7)
subject to the usual ﬂow and physical constraints, Eqs. 4
and 3. The terms in Objective 7 represent the total power
ﬂow into and out of the network through T,a f t e ra c c o u n t -
ing for step-up/down losses at the transformer. This opti-
mization is more diﬃcult than the others since ﬂows on the
public network are set using a separate objective (physics-
based energy minimization). This computation is explained
below.
The ﬂows induced by the cooperative model in Fig. 1 are
quite diﬀerent from those in the previous models. Flows on
the upper and lower branches resolve the earlier ineﬃcien-
cies: the upper ﬂow from A1 to A2 and A3 uses the public
and private links equally to minimize resistive losses, and
on the lower branch, power from A6 ﬂows to A7 instead of
A5. Despite the improvement, ﬂow on the middle branch
remains ineﬃcient due to physics-based routing, causing A4
to draw power from both T and A1.
The Integrated Model. In the integrated model,w e
allow the ﬂow on all edges, both private and public, to be
controlled by the local agents, relaxing the constraint that
ﬂow on public edges be governed by the simple physics model
(which minimizes losses). This can be viewed as “ideal” be-
havior for agents on a network that have arbitrarily precise
routing equipment and some degree of control over (local)
distribution on public lines. This reﬂects the most eﬀective
use of resources if lines are expensive. It requires solution ofthe following optimization:
min
fu,v:(u,v)∈E
1
1 − β
 
v:(T,v)∈E
fT,v − (1 − β)
 
v:(v,T)∈E
f 
v,T (8)
subject to constraints Eq. 4. The objective is identical to
that in the cooperative case (Eq. 7) except that all ﬂows are
controllable, not just those on private links.
The ﬂows induced by the integrated model in Fig. 1 are
the same as those of the cooperative model on the upper and
lower branches. However, because no physics-based ﬂows
occur, the ineﬃciency on the middle branch disappears, and
A4 will draw power only from A1.
Computation. Except for the Cooperative model, the
optimization problems above are all convex, quadratically-
constrained quadratic programs (QCQP) that can be solved
by CPLEX or other oﬀ-the-shelf optimizers. In the cooper-
ative case, we approximate the solution by ﬁrst computing
ﬂows on the private network as in the integrated model, and
then (approximately) minimizing the objective by comput-
ing the physics-induced ﬂows on the public network. The re-
sult is a feasible solution whose quality, in our experiments,
is within a few percent of that of Integrated (which in turn
oﬀers a lower bound on Cooperative).
4. A SIMPLE INCENTIVE SCHEME
While the methods above compute optimal coordinated
behavior, we must also ensure incentives can be put in place
such that all agents eﬀectively cooperate by actually adopt-
ing the strategy prescribed by the optimal solution. The aim
of these prices is to induce the cooperative or integrated be-
havior described in the previous section. Which of the two
models can be used in practice depends on what kind of
routing equipment is available on the network.
Equilibrium Prices. We ﬁrst present a pricing scheme
that aligns the interests of each agent on the private network
with socially optimal behavior. This induces self-interested
agents to adopt the cooperative solution (or the integrated
solution if public links are controlled locally). Our tech-
nique is relatively standard in network models [19, 13, 9, 1]:
we compute agent-speciﬁc buy/sell prices using dual prices
obtained from the optimization. These induce individual
agents to implement the globally optimal solution by maxi-
mizing their own net utility at these prices.
We ﬁrst solve the integrated optimization Eq. 8. By the
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions, there is a set of dual vari-
ables μv ≥ 0 for each agent v ∈ V such that: (a) for each
edge (u,v), where u,v  = T:
−μv
 
1 −
2fu,vRu,v
U2
u,v
 
+ μu =0 ; ( 9 )
(b) for each edge (T,v):
1
1 − β
− μv
 
1 −
2fT,vRT,v
U2
T,v
 
= 0; (10)
and (c) for each edge (v,T):
−(1 − β)
 
1 −
2fv,TRv,T
U2
v,T
 
+ μv =0 . (11)
The values of these dual variables “price” the direct trans-
mission to and from each agent. We charge each agent v:
• μv f o re a c hu n i ts e n tt ou  = T and −μu for each unit
received (after losses) by u  = T.
•− μu for each unit sent from u  = T and μv for each
unit received (after losses) from u  = T.
Assume these prices are ﬁxed. Each v in the local network
has the following “personal” optimization to maximize its
utility for the (net) power received minus the price paid:
max
fu,v:(u,v)∈E
fv,u:(v,u)∈E
Uv
⎛
⎝Qv +
 
u:(u,v)∈E
f 
u,v −
 
u:(v,u)∈E
fv,u
⎞
⎠
+
 
u:(v,u)∈E
u =T
 
μvfv,u − μuf 
v,u
 
+
 
u:(u,v)∈E
u =T
 
−μufu,v + μvf 
u,v
 
The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions for this problem are a
subset of those for global optimization. Thus, the optimal
ﬂow for any agent at the given prices coincides precisely
with the globally optimal ﬂows. Furthermore, no coalition
of agents can improve their aggregate utility by changing
their strategies at these prices. In other words, these prices
induce a strong Nash equilibrium that coincides with the
globally optimal outcome. However, these prices have some
weaknesses. We have no guarantee about the total amount
paid to the mechanism (ideally, it is zero). We also cannot
know if the agents would participate if we do not know their
previous contracts. We address these issues further below.
Core Stability. If the prices that arise as the by-product
of optimization are taken as given, they induce strongly sta-
ble optimal behavior in utility-maximizing agents. However,
if the market coordinator has no binding power to force
agents to accept these prices, some may refuse to “enter
this market” if they had prior local arrangements that gave
them higher utility. For example, in a network with a single
private edge between a generator and a consumer, these two
agents will likely beneﬁt greatly by using this edge, and be
unwilling to agree to a change in pricing without induce-
ment. Furthermore, while coalitional defections cannot be
beneﬁcial given these ﬁxed prices, the allocation induced by
these prices cannot generally be supported if one or more
agents refuse to participate. Thus, we need to consider pay-
ment schemes that prevent such defection.
Superﬁcially our models seem to ﬁt within the framework
of market games, albeit with variable“transaction”costs in-
duced by distance and load. Unfortunately, there is no nat-
ural characteristic function representation. The value that
one coalition of cooperating agents receives from a given
strategy can be altered by the actions of another: if a sec-
ond coalition routes power over the same lines, the higher
load increases power loss quadratically. Research on market
games [20] shows that core transfers exist in a variety of ex-
changes by using dual variables of allocation optimization as
prices, as we do above, making core transfers easy to com-
pute. However, our model is not reducible to market games
due to interaction eﬀects. These require that, when reason-
ing about potential defections from the grand coalition, we
should consider Nash equilibria that emerge when treating
diﬀerent coalitions as players.
We have not yet been able to prove that transfers exist
that support a strong Nash equilibrium (or loosely, a core
imputation). We strongly suspect that this is so: in all in-
stances tested empirically, we are able to compute stability-
inducing transfers. This remains an important topic of re-search. We note that if the market coordinator (system op-
erator) knows of existing arrangements between agents prior
to joining the coordinated local network, participation con-
straints that induce them to participate can be easily ad-
dressed. If the agents were to agree to participate in the
pricing scheme, the social welfare of the system will increase
by a non-negative amount, since the current distribution
schedule is a feasible option in the global optimization. The
operator can distribute this surplus to agents on the pri-
vate network, guaranteeing that each receives utility at least
equal to that derived prior to coordination.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We ran experiments to test the impact of using each of the
four models of agent behavior in a variety of scenarios. We
use both random and existing models of public networks; but
since private infrastructure is rare (except for self-contained
microgrids with single-point connections to the public grid),
we make some general assumptions about private-network
structure and test various parameterizations. Some reﬂect
current practice, while others reﬂect future scenarios with
increased usage of local, private generation and infrastruc-
ture. Our proxy for social welfare is distribution loss, i.e., the
amount of power originating in the public grid not consumed
by agents in the local network (assuming all agent demands
are satisﬁed). This correlates linearly with social welfare
assuming local producers have linear cost curves for gener-
ation.
3 All local networks in our experiments (realistically)
consume more power than they produce and have average
transmission and distribution loss of around 7% (with std.
dev. of 2.5%) when no private infrastructure or distributed
generation is assumed: this is the current U.S. average (with
most losses due to distribution).
Our ﬁrst experiments use random public networks: 100
agents are distributed uniformly over a square grid of size
either 100×100km (low density) or 1×1km (high density).
We generate a distance-minimizing spanning tree connect-
ing these agents (and T), reﬂecting how most public dis-
tribution networks are constructed. Links between agents
have voltage of 22kV, and links to T are 50 kV (higher load
links are typically higher voltage). All edges have 0.2o h m s
of resistance per km. Transformer losses at T are given by
β =0 .02 (this determines the theoretical lower limit on dis-
tribution loss for a net-consumer network, as all publicly-
supplied power must pass through T). We use a 10% gap
between the grid buy price pb and sell price ps.
Agent demands are distributed normally N(μ,σ), with
σ varying with the amount of private generation: we set
σ = μ/2 (low private generation), 3μ/4 (medium), and 5μ/4
(high), meaning that we expect 2.5%, 9%, and 21% of agents
(resp.) to be net producers. The private network is gen-
erated by sampling an Erd¨ os-Renyi random graph, with p
determining edge density: each edge is included with proba-
bility p. We use edge densities of 0 (i.e., no private network),
1
n2,
1
n,a n d
1
log(n) (the last representing heavy investment in
private infrastructure).
Fig. 2 illustrates our experimental setup, 40 agents for
clarity: this network has 22 private and 39 public edges and
high distributed generation. Power ﬂows mainly on the pub-
lic network in the Ad Hoc and Private Self-interest models,
3Since cost curves are typically convex, our results underes-
timate t h et r u ei m p r o v e m e n ti ns o c i a lw e l f a r e .
but the private network is used more in the Cooperative and
Integrated models. In this scenario, distribution losses are
11.3% in Ad Hoc, 11.4% in Private Self-interest and 3.8% in
Cooperative and Integrated.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our results on random public
networks, with each data point showing average distribution
loss over 1000 random instances.
4 At a high level, we see
that Cooperative and Integrated provide signiﬁcantly lower
losses relative to Ad hoc and Private Self-interest in nearly
all cases. We see relatively small amounts of savings at pri-
vate edge densities of 0 and
1
n2 and relatively large amounts
at
1
n and
1
log(n). Increased private network density corre-
lates very strongly with savings in the more coordinated
models: losses are roughly 60% less than in Ad hoc and Pri-
vate Self-interest when edge density is
1
n or greater (in both
the low and high node density models). With edge density
1
log(n), distribution losses approach the lower bound of 2%
associated with purchase of all power from the grid with no
resistive (only transformer) loss.
Our second set of experiments uses the IEEE 300-bus test
system as the public network, with the same random pri-
vate networks as described above. The test system has 300
nodes and 409 edges and has balanced supply and demand
due to the presence of a few large power producers. Since
the system lacks spatial coordinates, we use a“spring-based”
energy minimization algorithm to estimate the relative posi-
tions of the nodes. We then scale these positions in order to
test both dense and sparse conﬁgurations. Table 3 shows re-
sults of 100 trials.
5 The results are broadly similar to those
above except in Private Self-interest, where losses spike to
20% at edge density
1
n and then fall to around 2.5% at den-
sity
1
log n. We discuss this diﬀerence below in the context of
model performance.
Theoretically, Integrated should be more eﬃcient than Co-
operative, which in turn should outperform Ad hoc and Pri-
vate Self-interest; indeed our results reﬂect this.
6 No analy-
sis yet suggests how Ad hoc and Private Self-interest mod-
els compare. In practice, they perform similarly on random
public networks, but very diﬀerently in the IEEE test net-
work. This is due to supply distribution in the test network,
with just a few large producers. When a (graph) component
forms at
1
n edge density containing a large producer, all de-
mand in that component will be met; but at the expense of
eﬃciency. At density
1
log(n), demand is met eﬃciently using
only the large private network. This does not happen in the
random models (where private networks are net consumers).
Our results assume a ﬁxed buy-sell price gap of 10%. The
smaller this diﬀerence, the less trading occurs in the Ad hoc
and Private Self-interest models. A small gap mediates the
eﬀect of bad routing decisions on the private network, but
also causes less usage of private edges, increasing load on
public infrastructure. Tables 1 and 2 show a mild increase
in losses as more distributed generation is deployed. This is
4Std. dev. is 2.5-3% for losses in the 7% range, 0.5% around
3%, and 0.01% around 2%. All diﬀerences between Ad
hoc/Priv. self-int. vs. Coop./Integrated with non-zero edge
density are signiﬁcant at p<0.05.
5Std. dev. is about 13% in Priv. at density
1
n,1 %f o rA d
hoc at
1
n and
1
log(n), and less than 0.2% otherwise.
6With low node density, low distributed generation and
1
n
edge density, Integrated performs slightly worse than Coop-
erative (due to build up of rounding error).Figure 2: An example network under diﬀerent models of agent cooperation. From left, Ad Hoc, Private Self-interest, Cooperative and
Integrated. Net consumer agents are white, net suppliers are blue, and the network connection is black. Edge darkness represents amount
of ﬂow. Public network edges are thicker than private network edges.
not surprising since this also introduces higher demands in
our model (we keep net local demand constant)—load be-
comes more focused around large producers and consumers,
causing large losses at these points. Average loss in the zero
private edge case is 7.19% in low distributed generation and
7.29% in high distributed generation. With
1
log(n) edge den-
sity, average loss is 4.69% in low distributed generation and
4.73% in high distributed generation.
Fig. 3 compares losses for Ad Hoc and Cooperative as
load on the network increases in a scenario with medium
distributed generation and density
1
n using random public
networks. Losses increase much more rapidly in the Ad Hoc
model, albeit with high variance due to the many random
parameters of each trial. Our analysis focuses on low-loss
scenarios, which are those primarily seen in the developed
world; but it is important to note that the gap in model
performance increases rapidly as load approaches the limits
of the distribution system.
Computationally, networks of this size were easy to solve,
with the convex quadratically-constrained quadratic pro-
grams requiring well under one second. While the microgrid
setting is not problematic (most networks have less than 150
nodes), scaling issues might arise in larger networks. We
tested larger settings of up to 300 nodes and 90,000 edges,
and were able to solve them in under an hour on a 12x2.6
Ghz system. With knowledge of prior payments, or with the
ability to impose a pricing scheme, computing stabilizing
payments in this context is also easy since it only requires
the values of the dual variables. Without this, stabilizing
payments may require approximation.
Amt. of
dist. gen. Model Edge density on priv. net.
0 1
n2
1
n
1
log(n)
Low
Ad hoc 7.14 7.25 7.05 7.13
Priv. self-int. 7.14 7.25 7.05 7.13
Coop. 7.14 6.95 2.91 2.16
Integrated 7.14 6.95 2.92 2.16
Med.
Ad hoc 7.28 7.19 7.15 7.20
Priv. self-int. 7.28 7.19 7.15 7.20
Coop. 7.28 6.92 2.93 2.16
Integrated 7.28 6.91 2.93 2.16
High
Ad hoc 7.32 7.26 7.28 7.22
Priv. self-int. 7.32 7.26 7.27 7.20
Coop. 7.32 6.93 2.95 2.16
Integrated 7.26 6.87 2.94 2.16
Table 1: Avg. distribution loss as a percentage of net demand in
a low (node) density network (1 agent per sq. kilometer).
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a routing scheme that coordinates con-
trol of private infrastructure with the public grid, improv-
ing social welfare while satisfying participation constraints
Amt. of
dist. gen. Model Edge density on priv. net.
0 1
n2
1
n
1
log(n)
Low
Ad hoc 7.25 7.28 7.31 7.33
Priv. self-int. 7.25 7.28 7.31 7.33
Coop. 7.25 6.97 2.93 2.16
Integrated 7.24 6.97 2.93 2.16
Med.
Ad hoc 7.22 7.39 7.40 7.08
Priv. self-int. 7.22 7.39 7.40 7.09
Coop. 7.22 7.05 3.00 2.16
Integrated 7.21 7.04 3.00 2.16
High
Ad hoc 7.30 7.26 7.50 7.41
Priv. self-int. 7.30 7.26 7.50 7.39
Coop. 7.30 6.91 3.00 2.16
Integrated 7.26 6.85 2.99 2.16
Table 2: Avg. distribution loss as a percentage of net demand in
a high (node) density network (100 agents per sq. kilometer).
Node
density Model Edge density on priv. net.
0 1
n2
1
n
1
log(n)
1k mx1
km
Ad hoc 7.13 7.13 7.64 5.63
Priv. self-int. 7.13 7.13 21.73 2.39
Coop. 7.13 7.12 4.79 2.16
Integrated 7.11 7.10 4.78 2.16
100 km x
100 km
Ad hoc 7.20 7.20 7.68 6.12
Priv. self-int. 7.20 7.20 22.05 2.50
Coop. 7.20 7.17 4.87 2.29
Integrated 7.07 7.05 4.76 2.15
Table 3: Avg. distribution loss as a percentage of net demand in
networks derived from the IEEE 300-bus test system.
for the agents who control private infrastructure if we as-
sume that coalitions of agents have the ability to calculate
stabilizing payments. We presented several models of agent
behavior under diﬀerent incentive conditions and tested the
eﬃciency of various power distribution networks under dif-
ferent models. Using private infrastructure in cooperation
with public infrastructure was shown to be quite important.
Although we were able to compute “core” stabilizing pay-
ments empirically in all instances, it remains open whether
they always exist. Our cooperative game-theoretic model as-
sumes that public grid prices are ﬁxed, regardless of the be-
havior of agents on the private grid. This is reasonable from
a short-term perspective if prices reﬂect long-term costs of
supplying electricity, or when there are few private agents.
Fixed prices also simplify analysis (generation cost curves
can be ignored). If generation costs are convex, the prob-
lem remains straightforward (there is additional incentive for
agents to cooperate, though further analysis is warranted).
We conjecture that there is a class of cooperative games
that generalizes market games to allow non-independentcon-
gestion costs while retaining the property that core pay-
ments always exist. This class would include at least the
power distribution game with ﬁxed prices on the public gridFigure 3: Scaling behavior, Ad Hoc (red) Cooperative (blue), as
net demand increases (2nd-degree polynomial ﬁt is shown).
as described above, but also would include games with other
transmission losses (likely restricted to convex losses).
Our experimental results show that coordination is crit-
ical. Without it, private links can be constructed without
decreasing overall network load. Indeed, building a private
link may be proﬁtable for an agent in the short term; but
if many agents construct links without coordinating, the re-
turn on investment for the group may be zero.
Since our random network models have relatively small
amounts of distributed generation (i.e., the networks are net
consumers), the main routing objective is to deliver power
as cheaply as possible. Although self-interested use of pri-
vate lines reduces the demand served by the public grid, the
savings are small compared to those created by using private
lines to assist in distribution. In networks where supply and
demand are balanced (e.g., the IEEE test network), the role
of the grid changes to distributing electricity locally. In this
case, private infrastructure can have a signiﬁcant negative
impact (as we see in our experiments) without coordination.
Some avenues for future work include relaxing our net-
work formation assumptions (e.g., trying diﬀerent random
graph models), and using our incentive schemes to determine
pricing and capital cost-sharing of new (private and public)
infrastructure. Studying the mechanism design problem in
this setting is also important. We assume that agent de-
mands are known (e.g., from historical data) or that agents
report their utility functions truthfully. Asking each agent
for a complete utility function may be expensive, infeasible,
or vulnerable to manipulation.
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